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AN EXAMPLE OF JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S EXPANSION OF EXEMPTION 6 OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT TO INCLUDE
UNION AUTHORIZATION CARDS
MARTIN

I.

J. SOBOLt

INTRODUCTION

N THE RECENT CASE OF Committee on Masonic Homes v.
NLRB,1 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether, under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),2 an employer is entitled to
copies of authorization cards that have been submitted by a union to
the National Labor Relations Board (Board) in support of a petition
for a representation election. 3 In brief, the court held that union
authorization cards fell within exemption 6 of the FOIA (Exemption
6), which exempts from disclosure "personnel and medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. ' 4 It is submitted that
Masonic Homes seriously contorts the FOIA's disclosure requirements and exemptions.
It is important to note at the outset that past FOIA cases that
concerned the Board have involved unfair labor practice, rather than
representation, issues.5 These decisions have established that the
FOIA does not require disclosure of documents held by the Board in
connection with unfair labor practice charges. 6 However, in unfair
t B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1970; J.D., Duquesne University School
of Law, 1973. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. Mr. Sobol was counsel for the appellee in
Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977), which is the
major decision discussed in this article. Mr. Sobol is a partner with Pechner,
Dorfnan, Wolffe, Rounick & Cabot, Philadelphia, Pa.
1. 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
3. 556 F.2d at 215, 218-22.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). See 556 F.2d at 219-21.
5. See, e.g., Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Roger J. Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976);
Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976); Local 30, United
States Workers Ass'n v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976); L'Eggs Products, Inc.
v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1976); Donn Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 93
L.R.R.M. 2065 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 1976); NLRB v. Biophysics System, Inc., 91
L.R.R.M. 3079 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1976).
6. See, e.g., Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 895 (1976); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.
1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976); Local 30,
United States Workers Ass'n v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976); L'Eggs
Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 93 L.R.R.M. 2488 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1976); NLRB v.
Biophysics System, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 3079 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1976).
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labor practice cases, the Board assumes a prosecutorial role;
whereas, in representation proceedings, the Board takes a nonadversary, fact-finding and neutral stance. 7 Therefore, FOIA cases
involving unfair labor practice charges are not applicable to
disclosure requests in representation cases, and the Third Circuit in
Masonic Homes was presented with an issue never before addressed
by an appellate court.
The Third Circuit's resolution of this issue is far from
satisfactory. It is submitted that the court's reliance upon Exemption
6 is neither logical nor supported by existing case law or the
legislative history of the FOIA. Furthermore, it is submitted that the
court contorted the FOIA in order to make a policy decision that
exceeded the scope of its judicial power.
This article will explain in detail the origin of Masonic Homes
and the Third Circuit's decision. An analysis of that decision will
then be undertaken.

II.

THE BOARD'S RESPONSE TO FOIA
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

Congress enacted the FOIA to open the doors of the administrative decisionmaking process. 8 To achieve this goal the FOIA is
designed "to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure
.... ,,9 As the FOIA is structured, virtually every document is
available to the public in one form or another "unless information is
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language."10 Moreover,
in accordance with congressional intent, the courts have interpreted
the obligation to disclose broadly, and the exemptions narrowly. 1
It has also been established that in proceedings brought
pursuant to the FOIA, the agency possessing the requested
information has the burden of proving the applicability of one of the
exemptions preventing disclosure, 12 and the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the rights sought to be secured under the FOIA are
not affected by the fact that the plaintiff is a litigant in a pending

7. See American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 405 (1940).
8. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
813].
9. Id.
10. Id. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 136 (1975).
11. Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973). See S. REP.
No. 813, supra note 8, at 3.
12. See 556 F.2d at 218, citing Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,
361-62 (1976), and NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1972).
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agency proceeding.' 3 A court must regard a plaintiff who is a litigant
in a pending agency proceeding just as it would any disinterested
party requesting the same information, "neither penalizing. . . [the
plaintiff] . . for its self-interest in seeking disclosure nor allowing
it any greater consideration because of the consequences which
14
might result from nondisclosure."'
In spite of these clearly enunciated policies and court pronouncements, the Board has steadfastly maintained a policy of nondisclosure. 15 The present action was instituted in order to challenge the
Board's policy of nondisclosure in a representation election proceeding. It is important to note that at all times material herein, there
were not, nor have there ever been, any unfair labor practice charges
6
filed against the employer seeking disclosure in Masonic Homes.'
Thus, the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings in this particular case made it an appropriate test of the Board's policy of non7
disclosure.'

III.

THE BACKGROUND OF

Masonic Homes

The Committee on Masonic Homes of the R. W. Grand Lodge, F.
& A.M. of Pennsylvania (Home) operated a nursing home in
Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania.' 8 On February 20, 1976, the American
Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO (Union) filed a Representation
Petition with the regional office of the Board requesting that the
Board conduct an election among certain of the Home's employees to
determine whether they desired to be represented by the Union for
purposes of collective bargaining. 9 The petition alleged that a
"substantial number" of the Home's employees desired representation and that the petition was supported by at least thirty percent of
the employees in question. 20 Also in support of its petition, the Union
submitted "authorization cards."' 21 On March 6, 1976, the Home sent

13. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975).
14. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Nash, 78 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11, 182, at 20,040 (D.S.C.
Nov. 12, 1975).
15. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Wellman Indus. Inc.
v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
16. Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
17. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.

18. 556 F.2d at 216.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id. The Third Circuit explained the significance of authorization cards:
"Union authorization cards are cards signed by employees, authorizing a certain
union to represent them, 'for all purposes of collective bargaining in respect to wages,
hours and other conditions of employment."' Id. at 217 (footnote omitted), quoting 29
U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). For a sample of an authorization card, see 556 F.2d at 217 n.2.
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a letter to the Regional Director challenging the sufficiency of the
Union's showing of interest in regard to its petition for a
22
representation election.
On March 15, 1976, the Home requested the Regional Director to
disclose, pursuant to the FOIA, "all authorization cards submitted
by the [Union] as evidence of its showing of interest" 23 and "any
documents indicating the Region's final determination of the
[Union's] showing of interest or lack thereof. ' 24 The Regional
Director denied the Home's request on the ground that the
documents were privileged from disclosure under exemptions 5, 6,
7(A) and 7(C) of the FOIA. 2s The Home appealed the Regional
Director's denial to the Board's General Council, which affirmed the
26
Director's refusal to disclose.
Thereafter, the Home filed a suit in the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to compel disclosure of the
information requested in its March 15th letter to the Regional
Director and to enjoin the Board from proceeding on the representation petition until the requested documents were produced. 27 The
district court considered the applicability of exemptions 5, 6, 7(A),
7(C) and 7(D) of the FOIA, 28 but concluded that none of the
29
exemptions protected the authorization cards from disclosure.

22. 556 F.2d at 216. Specifically, the Home objected to the fact that the Union
based its claim of 30% employee support on a total of 320 employees, while the payroll
records of the Home indicated a workforce of 480 or more. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (6), (7)(A), (C) (1976). See 556 F.2d at 216.
26. See 556 F.2d at 216.
27. Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (6), 7(A), (C), (D) (1976); see 414 F. Supp. at 431-34.
29. 414 F. Supp. at 431, 433. Exemption 5 of the FOIA (Exemption 5) protects from
disclosure "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976). The Board argued that Exemption 5 was applicable because
authorization cards are "predecisional memoranda which reflect the ... [Board's]
deliberative process" and are included in the "attorney work-product privilege." 414 F.
Supp. at 431. Since no adversary proceedings, such as an unfair labor practice charge,
were pending in this case, the court rejected the Board's argument and concluded that
Exemption 5 did not cover authorization cards submitted in support of a representation petition. Id.. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
The district court also determined that authorization cards do not fall within
Exemption 6, which protects "personnel," "medical" or "similar files" from disclosure.
414 F. Supp. at 432. For the pertinent text of Exemption 6, see text accompanying note
4 supra. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily upon Robles v. EPA,
484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973), where the Fourth Circuit held that Exemption 6 was
applicable only to "'intimate details' of a 'highly personal nature' in ... [an]
individual's employment record or health history or the like." Id. at 845. See 414 F.
Supp. at 431-32.
Exemption 7(A), (C) and (D) of the FOIA (Exemption 7(A), (C) and (D))
protects "investigatory records compiled for purposes of law enforcement," where
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Consequently, the court ordered the NLRB to permit the Home to
30
inspect the cards.

IV.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION

The Third Circuit is the only appellate court that has considered
the issue of whether an employer is entitled, under the FOIA, to
copies of authorization cards that have been submitted by a union to
31
the Board in support of a petition for a representation election. It is
submitted that the Third Circuit contorted the FOIA in order to
make a policy decision that was beyond its power to make. In this
section, the decision will be examined in detail to illustrate how this
occurred.
The Third Circuit reversed that portion of the district court's
judgment ordering disclosure of the cards, holding that the union
authorization cards were privileged under Exemption 6.32 The
proceedings were, however, remanded for the limited purpose of
clarification by the district court of its order to disclose documents

disclosure would "interfere with enforcement proceedings," or "constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," or "disclose the identity of a confidential
source." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C), (D) (1976). Since the Board assumes a neutral role
in a representation proceeding, the district court found it difficult to conclude that
authorization cards constitute investigatory records compiled for purposes of law
enforcement. 414 F. Supp. at 432. Moreover, after balancing the need for disclosure
against the extent of personal privacy involved, the court determined that disclosure
of authorization cards to an employer would not constitute an unwarranted invasion
of the employees' privacy. Id. at 432-33. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-75
(D.C. Cir. 1971). The district court further concluded that disclosure would not
interfere with any enforcement proceedings because the Board's statutory duty merely
entailed a decision as to whether or not a representation election should be held. 414
F. Supp. at 433. Finally, the court decided that since there had been no showing that
the authorization cards were received "in confidence," Exemption 7(D) did not apply.
Id. In short, the district court rejected each of the statutory exemptions that were
advanced by the Board to justify denying the Home's request to see the authorization
cards submitted by the Union in support of its representation petition. Id. at 430.
30. 414 F. Supp. at 430. The disclosure order was stayed by the district court,
pending the disposition on appeal. See 556 F.2d at 217.
31. See 556 F.2d at 215. The case was heard before Chief Judge Seitz and Circuit
Judges Aldisert and Hunter. Judge Hunter wrote the opinion of the court.
32. Id. at 222. For the pertinent text of Exemption 6, see text accompanying note 4
supra. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that Exemption 7(A) and (C) of
the FOIA did not apply to union authorization cards that are submitted to the Board
as evidence of 30W employee support of a petition for a representation election. Id. at
218. See note 29 supra. The Third Circuit concluded that in these circumstances,
authorization cards were not compiled for law enforcement purposes, as required by
Exemption 7. 556 F.2d at 218. This conclusion is well supported both by case law and
legislative history. See Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976);
Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 488-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976); Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 429-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 834 (1974); S. REP. No. 813, supra note 8, at 9; H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1966).
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indicating a final determination of interest. 33 A brief examination of
the circumstances of Masonic Homes will reveal that Exemption 6 is
totally inapplicable to the authorization cards sought by the Home.
As it was not disputed that the authorization cards were neither
personnel nor medical files, the preliminary issue resolved by the
court was whether the cards are "similar" files. 34 In its decision, the
Third Circuit set forth little more than a two-sentence conclusory
statement that the authorization cards are similar files because the
cards contain "a thumb-nail sketch of an employee's job classifica'35
tion and status.
Neither the language of the FOIA nor its legislative background
provides an explanation of the term "similar," as used in Exemption
6. However, in Department of the Air Force v. Rose,36 the Supreme
Court commented on the intended scope of Exemption 6 as follows:
"It is quite clear from the committee reports that the privacy concern
of Congress in drafting Exemption 6 was to provide for the
confidentiality of personal matters in such files as those maintained
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Selective
Service, and the Veterans Administration. ' 37 From this language
alone it could be argued that union authorization cards were not
contemplated in the reference to "similar files" in Exemption 6.
Moreover, other language in Rose concerning Exemption 6
demonstrates that the Third Circuit erred in concluding that
authorization cards are "similar files." Rose involved litigation
designed to compel disclosure of disciplinary case summaries of
United States Air Force Academy students.3 8 The Court ruled that
these records were "similar files" because "they relate to the
discipline of cadet personnel, . . . and most significantly, the
'39
disclosure of these summaries implicates similar privacy values.

33. 556 F.2d at 222. In addition to seeking the disclosure of the authorization
cards, the Home also requested to see "[a]ny documents indicating the Region's final
determination of the [Union's] . . .showing of interest or lack thereof." 414 F.2d at
429. The district court granted this request for disclosure. Id. at 428. Finding that the
parties were unable to explain which documents were subject to this disclosure order,
the Third Circuit remanded "to the district court, for clarification of that part of its
order." 556 F.2d at 222.
34. Id. See text accompanying note 4 supra. In Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. IRS,
502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit remarked that "(tihe common
denominator in 'personel and medical and similar files' is the personal quality of
information in the file, the disclosure of which may constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of privacy." Id. at 135.
35. 556 F.2d at 220.
36. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
37. Id. at 375 n.14 (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 355.
39. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
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In contrast, union authorization cards carry no such implication of
"privacy values." As a practical matter, an individual who signs a
card, unlike an Air Force Academy student subject to disciplinary
proceedings, cannot have an expectation of privacy. In most
instances, the cards are signed in public places and/or in the
presence of others, and unions frequently present signed cards to
employers in an effort to gain voluntary recognition. °
A review of the actual contents of a typical authorization card
further evidences the inapplicability of Exemption 6. The information listed on the cards bears little similarity to personnel or medical
files maintained by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, or the other government agencies specifically referred to in
42
Rose.41 Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit observed in Robles v. EPA,
Exemption 6 "applies only to information which relates to a specific
person or individual, and to intimate details of a highly personal
nature in that individual's employment or health history, or the
like. '' 43 Clearly, these cases indicate that the information contained
in union authorization cards - an employee's name, his employer,
work department, shift and address 44 - was not intended to be
protected from disclosure under Exemption 6. The only information
contained in an authorization card that is not already known to the
employer is the employee's name. There is no secrecy whatsoever
attached to the other information, such as the employee's home
address, employer and department. Further, the Third Circuit's
reliance on Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc. v. IRS, 45 in concluding that
Exemption 6 applied, 46 appears misplaced because that case is
clearly distinguishable from Masonic Homes. In Wine Hobby, the
information sought was totally unknown to the parties seeking
47
disclosure.
Having concluded that authorization cards are "similar files,"
the Third Circuit then addressed the issue of whether disclosure of
40. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974); NLRB
v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
41. See text accompanying note 37 supra. For a sample of the information
contained on an authorization card, see 556 F.2d at 217 n.2.
42. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
43. Id. at 845.
44. 556 F.2d at 217 n.2.
45. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
46. 556 F.2d at 219.
47. 502 F.2d at 134. Wine Hobby U.S.A., Inc., a seller and distributor of amateur
winemaking equipment, sought to obtain the names and addresses of all persons who
registered with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as
producers of wine for family use. Id. The purpose for acquiring this information was
to be able to send catalogues and other announcements to registered wine producers.
Id. For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
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the cards would "constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. ' 48 In its analysis, the Third Circuit applied the
balancing test mandated by the Supreme Court in Rose.4 9 This test
balances the individual's privacy against "the preservation of the
basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ... to open agency
action to the light of public scrutiny."5' Specifically, the Third
Circuit stated that "having found an invasion of privacy, a court
must then weigh against the seriousness of that invasion whatever
gain would result to the 'public.'"51
In deciding that disclosure of the cards would constitute an
invasion of privacy, the Third Circuit concluded that "an employee
who signed a card was entitled to a private choice, given the policies
of the [National Labor Relations Act]." 52 This conclusion was
apparently based upon an incorrect statement of law. The Third
Circuit criticized the district court for stating that an employer
would be entitled to examine authorization cards whenever a union
claims majority support and asks for immediate recognition. 53 In
contrast to the district court's position, the Third Circuit maintained
that the most a union in this situation might offer is to have a
neutral third party check the cards. 54 If in fact, this were the law,
employees would be "entitled to a private choice," and the Third
Circuit's conclusion would be valid. However, the Supreme Court's
decisions in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 55 and
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.56 clearly establish that unions do
frequently show the cards directly to employers in an attempt to
gain voluntary recognition. 57 Therefore, the Third Circuit relied upon
an incorrect premise in finding that an invasion of privacy would
result from disclosure.
The court then concluded that the invasion of privacy resulting
from disclosure would be clearly unwarranted because such
disclosure might have a chilling impact upon employees otherwise

48. 556 F.2d at 220-21. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
49. 425 U.S. at 372-73. See 556 F.2d at 220-21.
50. 425 U.S. at 372.
51. 556 F.2d at 220.
52. Id. (emphasis added). The policies to which the court was referring include
prohibiting an employer from challenging the sufficiency of the employee showing of
interest in support of a representation petition and granting employees the right to
vote for a collective bargaining representative by secret ballot. See id. at 217. The aim
of these policies, according to the court is to prevent an employer from ever finding
out which employees supported the union. Id.
53. Id. at 218 n.3.
54. Id.
55. 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
56. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
57. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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inclined to support and vote for a union.5 8 The speculative nature of
this argument is evidenced by the court's language: "[I]t is entirely
plausible that employees would be 'chilled' when asked to sign a
union card if they knew the employer could see who signed."5 9
However, this conjecture is unfounded in light of the facts of
Masonic Homes. First, there was absolutely no factual basis for even
speculating that the Home would retaliate against employees who
signed cards. In addition, there was no history of any unfair labor
practices or any other antiunion activity by the Home. 60 More
importantly, this whole line of reasoning has specifically been
preempted by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 6 1
In that case, the Supreme Court made it clear that a court must
regard a plaintiff who is a litigant in a pending agency proceeding
just as it would any disinterested party seeking the same information.6 2 Thus, the "chilling impact" that disclosure to an employer
would have no future organizational attempts was not a proper
consideration for the court. Clearly, the Third Circuit's reasoning on
this issue conflicts with the mandate of the Supreme Court in Sears,
Roebuck that a plaintiff should not be penalized for seeking
disclosure based on its own self-interest in the case. 63
Moreover, the appropriateness of disclosure under these circumstances is confirmed by the Supreme Court's holding in Linden
Lumber. Linden Lumber involved an employer who was confronted
by a union demand for recognition, that was supported by
authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees. 64 After
examining the cards that the union presented, the employer refused
to bargain on the ground that it doubted the union's majority
status.65 The Court ruled that under these circumstances, and absent
any unfair labor practices, the employer was not required to
voluntarily recognize the union.66 Rather, the employer had a right
to await the results of a representation election. 67 Most critical for
purposes of the issue at hand, the Court found no statutory infirmity
and, more importantly, no chilling impact upon the employees' right
to freely participate in a representation election as a result of the

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

556 F.2d at 221.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
See text accompanying note 16 supra.
421 U.S. 132 (1975).
Id. at 143 n. 10. See text accompanying notes i2-14 supra.
See 421 U.S. at 143 n.10.
419 U.S. at 302.
Id.
Id. at 307-10.
Id. at 310.
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employer's scrutiny of the authorization cards and knowledge of the
employees' union sympathies prior to the election.6 8 If the Supreme
Court was not troubled by the disclosure of authorization cards in
Linden Lumber, despite an impending representation election, there
is no basis for the Third Circuit's finding of an invasion of privacy
in this particular case, where a representation election was also
pending.
In applying the second arm of the balancing test for Exemption
6,69 the court found "no significant public interest in disclosure." 70 In
reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit stated: "If the basic thrust
of the [FOIA] is to inform the electorate of the ways in which
government agencies operate, the cards will disclose nothing." 71
This statement is grossly inaccurate. In actuality, the validity of the
union authorization cards goes to the very genesis of the representation election process, for it is at this stage that the Board decides
whether to impose its statutory authority upon the employer. The
number of signed cards and the authenticity of the signatures are
critical issues which will be more efficiently and more accurately
resolved if the right to public disclosure is recognized.
The important benefits that disclosure would provide clearly
distinguish this case from Wine Hobby, a decision heavily relied
upon by the Third Circuit. 72 In Wine Hobby, an amateur winemaking company sought disclosure of the names and addresses of
individuals who filed with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, as home wine producers. 73 The Third Circuit there denied
the company's request based upon Exemption 6.74 In so doing, the
court relied heavily upon the fact that "the sole purpose asserted for
disclosure was private commercial exploitation. ' 75 For this reason
alone, Wine Hobby should not have been used as a basis for denying
the request for disclosure in the instant case. Rather, it provides

68. See id. at 304-05.
69. See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra.
70. 556 F.2d at 221. The court emphasized that it was considering the benefit to
the public rather than the benefit to the Home specifically. It stated:
Masonic Homes has asserted its benefit - it wants to challenge the signatures
and avoid an election. We are not interested in the employer's benefit, though.
Rather we must consider the public benefit that would result from the disclosure,
to an employer or to anyone, of union authorization cards submitted to support
an election petition.
Id.at 220 (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. Id.at 219-20. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
73. 502 F.2d at 134.
74. Id.at 136-37.
75. Id.at 137. See note 47 supra.
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further support for the proposition that where legitimate public
policy reasons are set forth in favor of disclosure, Exemption 6 is
rendered inapplicable.
Moreover, it is important to recall that although a weighing of
interests is required under Exemption 6, this does not detract from
the overriding FOIA policy in favor of disclosure. 76 In the words of
one court, the "legislative plan creates a liberal disclosure requirement, limited only by specific exemptions which are to be narrowly
construed." 77 The legislative history is particularly elucidating with
respect to Exemption 6. The inclusion of the language "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" evidences a carefully
considered congressional policy favoring disclosure. At hearings
conducted prior to the final drafting and passage of the FOIA,
various federal agency spokesmen urged deletion of either the word
"clearly" or the entire phrase "clearly unwarranted," so that
nondisclosure could be permitted whenever disclosure would result in
any invasion of privacy. 78 Congress, however, refused to delete this
language, which it obviously considered critical in limiting the scope
of the exemption.
It is apparent that the Third Circuit's reliance on Exemption 6
as the basis for refusing disclosure of union authorization cards in
these circumstances is neither logical nor supported by existing case
law or the legislative history of the FOIA. It is submitted that the
Third Circuit chose to rely on Exemption 6 because it is the only
exemption in the FOIA that permits a balancing approach. Thus, by
invoking this exemption, the court was afforded the latitude to mold
the decision to reach the desired result. In so doing, it contorted the
concepts of "similar file" and "clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." Furthermore, in denying disclosure of authorization cards to employers in a representation context, the Third Circuit
decided, in effect, that the unfair labor practice proscriptions of
Section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)79 are
insufficient to protect employees from coercive employer tactics and
°
preserve the rights guaranteed to them in Section 7 of the NLRA.8

76. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.

77. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
78. Hearings on H.R. 5012 before the Subcomm. on Government Operationsof the
House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1965) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.6-74/7: R
24/3) (testimony of Fred B. Smith, Acting General Counsel, Treasury Dep't); id. at 151

(testimony of Clark Molenhoff, Vice Chairman, Sigma Delta Chi Comm. for Advance
of Freedom of Information); id. at 257 (testimony of William Feldesman, NLRB
solicitor).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
80. Id. § 157.
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The "chilling effect" that disclosure of the cards would have on
union organizational activity, alluded to by the Third Circuit,8 1 is
not a relevant consideration in light of the policy of the FOIA, the
mandates of the Supreme Court, and the protections afforded
employees by the NLRA, the Board, and the courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

The policy of the FOIA is "to establish a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure."8 2 However, this statutory policy may conflict
with the policy of the NLRA as enunciated in Section 7, that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right

to refrain from any or all of such activities

....

83

If indeed there is such a conflict, it must be resolved by Congress
through appropriate legislation and not by rewriting Exemption 6 to
accomplish this purpose, as the Third Circuit did in Masonic Homes.
In short, the Third Circuit rendered a hopelessly unpersuasive
opinion to reconcile what it perceived to be a conflict in the policies
of these two statutes. In so doing, it also overstepped its limited
judicial function and engaged in a policy-making role reserved to
Congress.
81. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
82. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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